We use relatively unexplored dimensions of US microdata to examine how US manufacturing employment has evolved across industries, rms, establishments, and regions from 1977 to 2012. We show that these data provide support for both trade-and technology-based explanations of the overall decline of employment over this period, while also highlighting the diculties of estimating an overall contribution for each mechanism. Toward that end, we discuss how further analysis of these trends might yield sharper insights.
1
Introduction US manufacturing since World War II exhibits three notable trends, illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1 . First, the manufacturing employment has diverged from nonmanufacturing employment, as shown on dierent axes in Figure 1A . While both series move upward until the late 1970s, manufacturing employment then begins to decline, even as other non-farm employment continues a steady rise. As a result, there is a continual decline in manufacturing employment's share of total US non-farm employment, from 32 percent in 1948 to 8 percent in 2017. Second, while US manufacturing employment fell just 12 percent over the 21 years between the post-war peak in 1979 and 2000, it then dropped by more than twice as much 25 percent from 2000 to 2012.
Third, despite the relative atness and subsequent sharp decline in US manufacturing employment, the right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows a steady rise in manufacturing real value added at more or less the same rate as non-manufacturing GDP over the same period, at least between the late 1970s and the Great Recession. The combination of relatively steady and then declining employment, and rising output, indicates that, over the long term, labor productivity has risen faster in the manufacturing sector than in the broader economy.
For a variety of reasons, including the perception that workers in manufacturing receive comparatively high wages conditional on education (Langdon and Lehrman (2012) ; Ebenstein et al. (2014) ), these trends have stirred intense discussion among both policy makers and academics. This debate can broadly be summarized as a dispute between views that emphasize the relative importance of trade versus technology.
The trade-based explanation contends that import competition has reduced US manufacturing employment by inducing labor-intensive, low-labor-productivity industries to move abroad. The technology view argues that the decline in manufacturing employment stems from innovations in production techniques, such as automation, that have dramatically increased output per worker. If, as implied by Figure 1 , consumers spend a constant share of their expenditure on manufactured goods, then an increase in labor productivity means fewer workers are needed to meet demand for those goods.
Discussions about the decline in US manufacturing employment often culminate in a request to decompose the decrease into the part that is due to trade and the part that is due to technology. Our view is that providing a denitive accounting of the amount of employment change attributable to either factor is extraordinarily dicult for two reasons. First, identifying the numerous changes in tari and non-tari barriers that have occurred over the last few decades, let alone the wide range of technologies that have been adopted, is a daunting task. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of recent eorts to answer such questions before turning to relatively unexplored dimensions of US microdata for further input. These data allow us to examine changes in US manufacturing employment across industries, rms, and regions, and thereby oer four new perspectives on how US manufacturing has evolved over the last several decades. We nd that while employment changes along these dimensions provide support for both trade-and technology-based explanations, they also highlight the diculties of cleanly separating one force from the other. Toward that end, we discuss how further analysis of the data we use might yield sharper insights.
Our rst perspective examines how the overall growth of US manufacturing employment and value added varies by sector. We nd that some sectors such as transportation equipment exhibit increases in output even as employment is falling, a potentially clear indication of technology adoption. On the other hand, it is not hard to nd examples of sectors, such as apparel, characterized by simultaneous increases in import penetration and reductions in both employment and output. Furthermore, the set of sectors experiencing declines in both employment and output increases after 2000.
Our second perspective analyzes employment loss along rm and establishment margins of adjustment. One of our more striking ndings given conventional expectations about how creative destruction due to trade and technology likely manifest is that net rm death accounts for just 25 percent of the overall decline in US manufacturing employment between 1977 and 2012. On the other hand, we nd a large role for net plant exit within incumbent rms, perhaps because adopting new technologies or adapting to import competition entails high xed costs that continuing rms are better able to absorb, and which are easier to implement by opening new plants.
Our third perspective breaks down the aggregate change in US manufacturing employment between 1977 and 2012 along regional margins of adjustment. We nd a steady reallocation of manufacturing employment away from the north and east towards the south and west until 2000, when employment starts falling in all regions.
The earlier transition may reect domestic oshoring, that is, a movement from higher-to lower-wage US regions in an era before foreign oshoring was cost-eective.
Our nal perspective takes a wider view of manufacturing rms by examining their non-manufacturing activities. We nd that manufacturing rms' non-manufacturing employment increases until 2000 primarily via the addition of new non-manufacturing establishments before leveling o. About a third of this growth is in professional services, a trend that may represent an evolution of US manufacturing rms into neurofacturers that increasingly provide intellectual services rather than physical goods (Leamer (2009)) . Prominent examples include Pitney Bowes, which has abandoned the production of postage meters to oer logistics services, IBM, which increasingly oers data solutions rather than mainframes, and Apple, which designs the iPhone in the US but uses oshore contractors for assembly .
2
Some of the Evidence Thus Far
The last three decades have witnessed dramatic changes in both trade and technology.
We provide a sense of some of these changes in Figure 2 , which plots U.S. manufacturing we report the share of manufacturing rms that imports from any country as well as 2 As discussed in Fort (2017) , plants' use of electronic networks to control or coordinate shipments involves not just using the internet or other networks, but also integrating electronic communication in the production process. Computer purchase data are not available in 1997, so we supplement the 3 A key message of Figure 2 is that both technology adoption and importing, including by US producers, generally rise over the sample period, sometimes simultaneously.
Researchers have adopted several approaches to identify eects of trade shocks on employment. Perhaps the narrowest denition of a trade shock is a change in trade pol- A related body of work exploits spatial variation in the distribution of manufacturing industries across the United States. Autor et al. (2013) demonstrate that regions with higher initial shares of employment in industries with greater exposure to imports from China experience relatively larger declines in employment and labor force participation. Regions with higher initial shares of employment in exposed industries also exhibit relative declines in the provision of public goods (Feler and Senses (2017) ) and marriage rates (Autor et al. (2017) ), as well as relative increases in household debt (Barrot et al. (2017) ) and crime (Che et al. (2017) ). These consequences carry over to health: Pierce and Schott (2016b) show that regions more exposed to US trade liberalization with China exhibit relative increases in deaths of despair, including drug overdoses. This connection is reminiscent of the spike in mortality rates among high-tenure workers laid o from the steel industry in Pennsylvania during the 1980s (Sullivan and Wachter (2009) ).
Studies like those noted above are often conducted using a dierence-in-dierences framework, which does not account for potential general equilibrium eects and thus complicates calculation of a trade shock's eect on the overall level of manufacturing employment (Muendler (2017) ). Quantitative models, often drawing on empirical evidence from such studies, do oer such estimates as well as quantications of the impact of trade on social welfare. Caliendo and Parro (2015) , for example, argue that Another strand of research aims to decompose the respective roles of trade and technology on employment and wages. Goos et al. (2014) and Autor et al. (2015) argue that technological change has decreased the relative demand for routine tasks; the latter compares the results for computerization of routine tasks to increased Chinese import penetration in the United States and concludes that Chinese imports play a larger role in the decline of US manufacturing employment, especially after 2000.
While this research uses careful measures to identify technology and trade, it remains susceptible to the possibility, highlighted in the anecdote presented in the introduction, as well as theoretical work in this area (e.g., Acemoglu (2002)), that a new technology's invention or adoption may itself be in response to a trade shock. Bernard et al. (2006) , Khandelwal (2010) and Bernard et al. (2011) show that US rms respond to import competition in part by upgrading their product mix. Bloom et al. (2016) nd evidence of technology upgrading within and across European rms that were more exposed to Chinese imports. In the US context, Autor et al. (2016) also nd that Chinese import penetration aects manufactures' innovative activities, though they document a negative relationship.
4 Finally, interconnectedness is also found in the other direction. Fort 4 In related research in labor economics, Clemens et al. (2017) show that imposing restrictions on (2017) and Steinwender (2018) show that innovations in communications technologies facilitate trade. As a whole, this research highlights the diculties associated with clean identication of one force over another. Apparel, in particular, has been subject to substantial tari and quota reductions in the United States during the period we study (Khandelwal et al. (2013) 5 Reallocation may operate through occupations as well as industries, presenting another challenge to identifying the impacts of trade and technology. That is, the characteristics that make occupations susceptible to oshoring, such as routineness, also render them susceptible to automation (Ebenstein et al. (2014); Oldenski (2014) ). Miscellaneous Products (339; second panels only), in which value-added rises even as employment falls. These divergent outcomes, and the large growth in labor productivity they imply, suggest labor-saving technological change. In automobiles, for example, the replacement of workers with robots is widespread. On the other hand, to the extent that import competition induces selection away from low-labor-productivity industries within sectors, trade might also be playing a role (Schott (2003 (Schott ( , 2004 (2018)). The iPhone, in particular, is well known for being designed in California and assembled using physical inputs from many countries, including the United States in China (Folbre (2013) ).
The growing prevalence of such supply chains highlights a subtle but potentially important distinction between trade as import competition and trade as a technology.
Although the bulk of US imports from China represent nished goods imported by US wholesalers and retailers (Bernard et al. (2010) ), Figure 2 reveals that a growing share of manufacturing rms import goods directly. These direct imports may have dierent consequences than import penetration: empirical analysis of US manufacturing rms by Antràs et al. (2017) nds that while a rm's presence in an industry subject to increasing levels of Chinese import penetration is associated with declining rm-level employment between 1997 and 2007, increases in the value of its direct imports from China are associated with either growing or no change in employment. In their quantitative model, the authors' provide a rationale for this dierence, showing how greater access to foreign sourcing opportunities can allow importers to lower prices and raise output, even as non-importing rms shrink. also nd that Danish rms exposed to increased import competition from China were more likely to oshore activities to Eastern Europe, which led to decreased domestic employment but not domestic output. Exploring the role of global value chains in the divergence between real output and employment is an important area for future research.
6 Houseman et al. (2011) also note that growth in manufacturing real value added may be overstated due to mismeasurement of prices for imported inputs. (Jarmin and Miranda (2002) ). Each establishment is assigned a single industry code in each year based on its predominant activity.
7 The data make a useful distinction between an establishment and a rm. An establishment denotes a single physical location where business transactions take place and for which payroll and employment records are kept, such as a manufacturing plant. In our analysis, as in ocial statistics, employees are grouped into industries based on the classication of the establishment in which they work. As a result, all employees in a manufacturing plant are classied as manufacturing employees, regardless of their occupation.
A rm is an organizational structure that can include one or more establishments, and therefore can span multiple industries. To capture all manufacturing employment in the LBD, our decomposition includes all rms observed to have at least one manufacturing establishment at any point during the 1977 to 2012 sample period. The employment totals reported in this section are restricted solely to the manufacturing establishments at these rms; employment at their non-manufacturing establishments is analyzed later in the paper.
We examine three mutually exclusive rm margins of adjustment: changes in employment within the continuing establishments of continuing rms (also referred to as the intensive margin of continuing rm-plants), changes due to the birth and death of establishments within continuing rms, and changes due to the birth and death of entire rms.
8 Figure 4 illustrates the results. The solid line displays overall US manu- 10 In other words, there is heterogeneity within rms 10 As discussed further in Appendix Section A.2, these correlations are found by regressing indicator variables for plant death over years t to t + 5 on indicator variables for the noted activities in year t, 11 One potential explanation for this result is that the rms that could re-orient themselves away from import-competing industries did so early on, either by shuttering plants or switching industries. For rms specializing in import-competing products, however, increased import penetration led to death.
The relatively small, -12 percent change in employment among continuing rmplants masks substantial gross ows associated with continuing rm-plants' expansion and contraction. We illustrate the magnitude of these gross ows in Figure 5 , which decomposes the three net margins displayed in Figure Another noteworthy feature of Figure 5 is the decline of all three gross job creation margins over time. These decreases are indicative of a drop in US business dynamism that has been documented across all sectors by Decker et al. (2016) . One potential explanation for this decline is a reduction in rms' responsiveness to productivity shocks due to rising adjustment frictions (Decker et al. (2018) ), such as regulatory constraints, or the use of oshore rather than domestic capacity to make adjustments. Another is a reduction in competition, perhaps as a result of increasing entry barriers associated with along with rm xed eects.
11 Unfortunately, given that trading is observed at the rm level, we are unable to examine whether plants that import are more or less likely to survive within rms over either period. 12 Inspired by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), we nd similar premia for rms that import industrial robots (Harmonized System product code 84.7950.0000) starting in 1997. These adoption premia are analogous to the size and productivity premia found for importers and exporters in the international trade literature (Bernard et al. (2007) ). As such, they may reect the fact that adoption of technology, like expansion into foreign markets, requires the payment of high xed costs that only the largest and most productive rms nd it optimal to incur.
Trade may also play a role in the decline of gross manufacturing job creation by pushing the US economy away from goods production and towards services. Pierce and Schott (2012) and Asquith et al. (2017) show that during the 2000s, industries with 12 These regressions are described in greater detail in Online Appendix Section A. Regions also display interesting variation in terms of the margins of rm adjustment. In Appendix Figure A .7, we show that employment loss due to net rm death is concentrated in New England and Mid-Atlantic, which together account for 16 percentage points of the overall 25 percentage point decline in US manufacturing employment precursor to international oshoring. Bernard et al. (2013) , for example, show that US labor markets exhibit substantial and persistent variation in relative skill endowments and wages over this period, and that labor markets with dierent relative wages tend to specialize in dierent groups of industries. Fort (2017) shows that US manufacturing establishments in high wage locations are more likely to fragment production, especially domestically. Anecdotal evidence suggests rms do in fact relocate in response to variation in wages across local labor markets. Radio Corporation of America (RCA), for example, continually moved production of its most labor-intensive products west and south in search of lower wages before moving it to Mexico in the 1990s (Cowie (2001) ). Such activity is consistent with the Holmes (1998) 14 Further insight into these explanations comes 13 In work not reported here, we nd that the trends displayed in Figure 6 are sensitive to how M rms are dened. For example, requiring rms to have at least some threshold level of employment in manufacturing in at least one year of the sample results in atter growth of NM employment over the sample period. In addition, the growth of NM employment at M rms, even with our broad denition of manufacturing rms, is slower than the growth of NM employment at NM rms. This dierential is also worthy of further exploration.
14 While recent research suggests that US manufacturers increasingly outsource ancillary services such as cleaning to domestic contractors (Dey et al. (2012) ; Berlingieri (2014) ; Katz and Krueger (2016) ), such activity would not be captured in Figure 7 as it traces NM employment within M rms. by making use of various communications and management technologies to focus on the engineering, design or marketing of goods rather than their physical production Fort (2015, 2017) ). 
Conclusion
The decline in US manufacturing jobs and concerns over the competitiveness of US manufacturers in a global market place have sparked considerable commentary and research in recent years, including several articles in this journal by Charles et al. (2016) , Baily and Bosworth (2014) , Tassey (2014), and Houseman et al. (2011) . A natural question arising in these discussions is whether trade or technology plays a larger role in the sector's outcomes. As we have explained, we nd that question to be overly broad. It may also distract needed attention away from research into how to facilitate reallocation among displaced manufacturing workers. Given that few economists advocate for restricting either technology or trade, such research seems both timely and prudent.
Instead, we have sought to gain new perspective on the decline of US manufacturing employment by examining relatively unexplored dimensions of microdata tracking US manufacturing rms over time, and considering how patterns in those data might be explained by various mechanisms associated with trade, technology, and other forces.
Here, we summarize a few of the empirical facts we report, and follow-up questions that are worth pursuing.
We nd that 75 percent of the -6.6 million decline in manufacturing employment We examine the correlation between use of technology and both rm employment and labor productivity via a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions in each census year of the form ln(Attribute
f .
(A.1)
The left-hand side variable is either the log employment or the log labor productivity 
A.2 Plant Death Regressions
We examine the correlates of plant death within multi-establishment rms by estimating the following OLS regression,
The left-hand side variable is an indicator for whether the plant exits between census years t and t + 5. After the constant, the second variable on the right-hand side represents indicators for whether the plant engages in a particular activity, such as purchasing computers or using an electronic network to control or coordinate shipments in census year t. ) represents the log dierence in rm-level manufacturing employment, total employment, real value added in manufacturing, or real value added in manufacturing per manufacturing worker between census years t and t + 5. Activity t f , as above, represents one of several actions, including purchasing computers, using electronic networks to control or coordinate shipments, being a direct importer of industrial robots (HS 84.7950.0000), being a direct importer of any good from any country, or being a direct importer from China. When considering the latter two activities, we also include contemporaneous t to t + 5 changes in the analogous industry-level import penetration, that is, change in overall import penetration or the change in import penetration from China. These additions allow for the possibility, discussed in Section 3 of the main text, that import competition and direct foreign sourcing may have dierent associations with rm outcomes. We note that these regressions are purely descriptive and should not be interpreted as providing causal evidence. As an additional caveat, we note that regressions are unweighted.
Results are presented in Table A Before 2000, computer purchasers exhibit declines in employment and real value added relative to non-purchasers, with the declines in the former being somewhat larger in absolute value. As a result, during this period, computer purchases are associated with increases in labor productivity. Results for being an importer or an importer from China are similar. A second notable trend in this panel is that for all three activities, the coecients in regressions considering total rm employment (column 2) are smaller than those for manufacturing employment (column 1), indicating that employment adjustment to the noted activities occurs disproportionately among manufacturing establishments.
After 2000, we nd a dierent pattern of results for rms that purchase computers and are direct importers. These activities are now associated with rising employment and rising real value added. Moreover, we nd the same pattern of results for rms that use electronic networks to control or coordinate shipments. In contrast, rms that import industrial robots see relatively less manufacturing employment growth than rms that do not import these robots, though there is no signicant relationship with their total employment and a positive and signicant relationship with real value added and labor productivity. These results are consistent with the premise that technology may replace workers even as it boosts output. Finally, importing from China is associated with a statistically signicant decrease in manufacturing employment after 2000, but no statistically signicant relationship with total employment or real value added.
Results for changes in either overall or Chinese import penetration at the industry level indicate negative correlations with employment after 2000. Table A.2 contains two other suggestive results. First, being an importer in post-2000 years is correlated with relatively higher growth in employment and real value added, whereas increased import penetration in the rm's initial and primary (based on employment) manufacturing industry is associated with statistically signicant relative reductions in growth in both outcomes. Higher growth in Chinese import penetration is associated with relatively lower growth in manufacturing and total employment, while the relationship with real value added growth is negative but statistically insignicant at conventional levels (p-value=0.12). Furthermore, the divergence in rm-level employment versus output correlations for robot importing and importing from China highlight the possibility that technology and trade may be factors in decreased manufacturing employment and increased output of US manufacturing rms. 
